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A PROPOSED UNIFORM CODE
FOR CONSUMER CREDIT
ROBERT L. JORDAN*
WILLIAM D. WARREN **
For a long time, all states have regulated, in greater or lesser
degree, the conditions under which credit is granted to the consumer
to finance his purchases of goods and services. The pattern of this
legislation has been to focus on particular types of creditors or par-
ticular types of transactions for special regulation. The result has been
a piecemeal growth of legislation which has often been inconsistent
and unevenly balanced in regard to the various types of creditors and
the various types of transactions that characterize the consumer-credit
business. For the past three years, the National Conference of Com-
missioners on Uniform State Laws has been engaged in the drafting of
the Uniform Consumer Credit Code for adoption by the several states.
This Code, which is now in preliminary draft form, is a single com-
prehensive statute regulating the whole spectrum of consumer credit,
and is designed to replace existing consumer-credit legislation in any
jurisdiction in which it may be adopted. This article briefly traces the
pattern of the existing system of consumer-credit regulation, notes
some of the shortcomings of this system which have led to compre-
hensive revision of the whole field through the new Code, and outlines
the more important features of the new Code.
I. THE EXISTING SYSTEM OF CONSUMER-CREDIT REGULATION
A. Historical Background
The first legislation in the consumer-credit field—the Uniform
Small Loan Law—was necessary because of the existence of usury
laws.' Since lenders could not profitably loan money to the ordinary
consumer within the permitted rates, many borrowers were forced to
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1 For a discussion of the Uniform Small Loan Law, see Curran, Trends in Consumer
Credit Legislation 16-44 (1965). The Seventh Draft of the USLL is set out id. at 144-57.
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meet their credit needs by dealing with lenders who operated outside
of the law. The elemental problem facing legislatures was that of
legitimizing consumer loans. This might have been done by simply
providing for a higher usury rate to cover consumer loans, but in-
stead, the campaign, which culminated in the proposal of the Uniform
Small Loan Law in 1916, took on some of the aspects of a social-
welfare movement to save the "necessitous borrower" from the hands
of the "loan shark." The legislative response reflected the low esteem
in which the public apparently held consumer "moneylenders" at that
time. Instead of legislation which merely authorized lenders to charge
higher rates to a defined class of consumer borrowers, the approach
adopted was that of creating a narrow class of lenders who were
privileged to charge higher rates. The class was limited to those who
were able to meet specified standards of character and fitness, and
who were willing to submit to heavy administrative supervision of
their activities. In short, legislatures viewed the problem of consumer
lending in terms of the character and reputation of the lender. Only
"good" people should be allowed to make loans in excess of the usury
rates, and only if they were carefully watched. Given the somewhat
illicit background of consumer credit in these early years, this may
have been the only feasible legislative solution. The consumer could
obtain small loans; the lender could make a profit; and the deep pub-
lic suspicion of those who charged high rates was assuaged by the
onerous licensing provisions.
In succeeding years, other types of lenders were authorized to
make consumer-type installment loans at rates in excess of those per-
mitted by the usury laws.' Among the earliest of these were the
industrial banks, followed by federal and state credit unions. Later,
most of the states enacted installment loan laws whose principal effect
was to allow commercial banks to enter the consumer field by making
direct installment loans at above-usury rates. For the most part, these
statutes continued the approach of the small loan laws: loans in excess
of usury rates could be made only by lenders whose entry into the
credit field was restricted by licensing or chartering requirements and
whose operations were administratively supervised.
Regulation of credit sales of goods and services came later, and
revolutionary changes in this area over the past forty years have
posed the greatest problems in legislative control of consumer credits
The need for sellers of high-priced items to utilize credit in selling
their goods led to the formation, in the 1920's, of sales finance com-
2 See id. at 5-14.
3 The historical background is sketched in Britton & Ulrich, The Illinois Retail
Installment Sales Act—Historical Background and Comparative Legislation, 53 Nw.
Rev. 137, 140-48 (1958).
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panies. These organizations purchased retail installment contracts
from dealers and often "floor-planned" their inventories. Commercial
banks, which at first had restricted their consumer activities to lend-
ing to sales finance companies, moved into direct competition with
them in purchasing dealer paper in the 1930's and 1940's. By the
1930's the "installment plan" had gained wide acceptance in most
hard-goods merchandising. In the dramatic rise in consumer credit
after World War II, the major retailers converted to revolving credit
and thereby made even soft goods available on a credit basis. Thus,
in one generation, the country evolved from what had been virtually
a cash economy to a credit economy in the sale of goods. Credit was
made available to economic classes that had never before had experi-
ence with it. Lower down-payments, lengthened maturities, and lower
standards of creditworthiness contributed to broadening the base of
the retail credit market to include almost anyone with a steady job.
The mass-production economy thrived, and the standard of living
soared.
The judge-made "time-price doctrine" made it possible for sellers
to utilize installment credit at consumer rates without seeking legis-
lative exemption from usury laws. 4 So long as the time-price doctrine
went unchallenged for retail installment contracts (and before the
advent of revolving credit which raised serious usury problems for
retailers), sellers and their financers had no need for legislation in the
credit area. Legislation in vendor credit, unlike lender credit, had to
come from the public rather than from the industry; hence, it was a
long time in coming. Not until after World War II, when credit selling
became a mature business, did legislative regulation begin to appear
in volume. 5
The first abuse to receive widespread legislative attention was
the practice of some sellers of failing to make fair disclosure of sig-
nificant aspects of the retail installment credit sale. In some cases,
the buyer was not even told the total amount he owed and might not
receive a copy of the contract he signed. Lack of disclosure enabled
the unscrupulous seller to burden the buyer with exorbitant credit
charges. Abuses in disclosure appeared in greatest volume in auto-
mobile sales, and the first retail installment sales acts were almost
entirely devoted to motor vehicle transactions.
4 The courts in most jurisdictions have exempted credit sales from usury laws by
holding that a seller may offer an article at two different prices—one a cash price and
the other a time or credit price. The fact that the time price exceeds the cash price
by an amount representing a rate of interest greater than that allowed under the usury
statute is deemed immaterial on the ground that the credit transaction is merely a sale
at a higher price. The leading American case is Hogg v. Ruffner, 66 U.S. (I Black) 115
(1861).
5 The legislative patterns in this area are described in Curran, op. cit. supra note 1,
at 91-123.
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The first motor vehicle retail installment sales acts were rudi-
mentary measures. California, the largest automobile market in the
nation, operated until 1962 on the basis of a brief statute which merely
(1) limited finance charges to an add-on rate of one per cent per
month for each month of the contract, (2) required that a copy of
the contract be given to the buyer and that it itemize all charges made,
(3) gave the buyer the right to prepay and prescribed a formula gov-
erning the amount of refund of unearned finance charges, and (4)
gave the buyer the right to a five-day written notice of intent to sell
a repossessed vehicle.° If the seller violated the rate ceiling or the
provisions regarding refund of finance charge upon prepayment, the
contract was unenforceable, except by a bona-fide purchaser, and the
buyer could bring a civil action to recover the amount that he had
paid. The statute gave the buyer no remedy at all for a violation of
the disclosure provisions. Nor were any administrative remedies pro-
vided.
Similar statutes were enacted in a number of states to cover the
installment sales of goods other than motor vehicles—the so-called
"all-goods" acts. As retail selling continued to grow, and additional
abuses appeared, several states began to enact more detailed install-
ment sales acts to deal specifically with problems arising from insur-
ance, add-on sales, unfair contract provisions, the transferee's status
in relation to the buyer, default and deferral charges, refinancing, and
so forth. When revolving credit became widespread among department-
store retailers, they became uneasy about the possibility that courts
might be reluctant to apply the time-price doctrine to a situation in
which monthly charges were made on the basis of outstanding bal-
ances. This apprehension led to concerted efforts to secure legislation
legitimizing revolving-credit charges.
B. Modern Trends
By the early 1960's, a huge body of consumer-credit regulation
had been enacted throughout the country, and today almost all sup-
pliers of consumer credit are subject to some form of control. Un-
fortunately, this legislation is characterized by a failure to treat con-
sistently the various types of creditors and transactions regulated.
Frequently, creditors performing essentially the same economic func-
tion are subjected to widely varying regulation. For instance, in New
York nine separate statutes regulate different segments of the con-
sumer-credit industry: (1) installment loans by commercial banks;
(2) installment loans by industrial banks; (3) bank check-credit
plans; (4) revolving-charge-account credit; (5) motor vehicle install-
ment sales financing; (6) installment sales financing of other goods
Cal. Civ. Code § 2982 (repealed).
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and services; (7) insurance-premium financing; (8) loans by con-
sumer finance or small loan companies; and (9) credit-union loans.
These statutes set fourteen different statutory maximum rates.?
One reason for this diversity can be found in the fact that con-
sumer-credit legislation has, in large part, been a reaction to specific
problems which have been solved specifically. Legislation has closely
followed existing industry practices, or has been tailor-made to fit a
particular kind of transaction. Since the purpose of small loan legisla-
tion was to allow the servicing of low-income borrowers, very high
rates were permitted, and very onerous regulation imposed. Since
the purpose of charge-account legislation was to legitimize existing
practices, such statutes adopted the prevalent rate as the maximum,
and provided for little else in the way of regulation beyond very mini-
mum disclosure requirements. Similarly, maximum automobile finance
rates were set to permit legitimate dealers to continue to charge the
rates common in the industry. Thus, the legislation tended to take the
status quo as the basis of regulation.
Whenever legislation grows in a fragmented manner, there is a
tendency for the law to lag behind new developments in the field
regulated. Most consumer-credit legislation is based on a conception
of the installment loan and the installment sale as the stereotype of
the consumer-credit transaction. Such legislation assumes: (1) that
the consumer loan or credit sale is a single, isolated transaction; (2)
that the terms of the transaction are entirely included in a written
contract usually resulting from a personal confrontation between the
parties; (3) that the total amount of the finance charge can be de-
termined at the time of the contract; and (4) that the transaction
can be treated as either a loan or a sale, and regulated accordingly.
The computer, the telephone, several decades of experience on the
part of credit grantors, and, perhaps, the affluence of our society, have
combined to make these assumptions inappropriate for a greatly ex-
panding body of consumer transactions.
The trend is decisively away from the static, "closed-end" credit
transaction and toward the fluid, "open-end" form of credit extension.
The development of revolving credit has been the innovation that
made the trend inevitable, and the credit card has been the vehicle of
the transformation. The old-fashioned thirty-day charge account and
the customer's "charge plate" appear to be the lineal ancestors of
today's system of revolving credit and credit cards. Merchants, weary
of not being able to collect some of their Christmas bills until March
7 This count represents the opinion of Roger S. Barrett, Esq., as stated in his
address to the Banking, Corporation and Business Law Section of the New York State
Bar Association, Jan. 26, 1967, on the subject of the proposed Credit Code.
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or April, began to impose a monthly service charge on accounts unpaid
for a given period after billing. The familiar department-store charge
plate was adopted by the oil companies to provide identification for
their customers at the service stations selling their products. Organiza-
tions which were not themselves sellers provided credit cards as a
convenience to consumers in obtaining hotel, restaurant, and travel
services. Lenders of money, such as banks, also entered the field and
issued credit cards which allowed card holders to buy goods and
services and to be billed on a revolving-credit basis by the lender.
The reliance upon credit cards has resulted in a breakdown of
the traditional dichotomy between loans and sales. For example, an
oil company may issue a credit card which can be used at all service
stations selling the oil company's products, as well as for purchases
of goods and services from other sellers. If the card is used at a
service station owned by the oil company, the transaction is simply a
credit purchase of goods or services, but if the card is used at a service
station not owned by the oil company, or to buy completely unrelated
goods or services, it would seem that the transaction is tantamount
to a loan of money by the oil company to the card holder. Yet all
transactions are necessarily treated the same by the oil company. It
should not be important whether a given transaction is a loan or a
credit sale. The important thing for the purposes of regulation is that
all the transactions do involve basically similar extensions of credit
by the issuer of the credit card.
The advantages of the revolving-credit cum credit-card method of
conducting consumer-credit business are great. The one-shot install-
ment sale is an expensive transaction. A retail installment sale contract
form—which grows more complex with each legislative session—must
be filled in to the last blank. In the absence of some previous relation-
ship between seller and buyer, a credit investigation may have to be
made. In case of prepayments, or deferral of payments, time-
consuming paper work must be done. Under revolving credit, on the
other hand, credit supplier and consumer need only enter into a simple
general agreement at the beginning of the relationship. The debtor
can pay off the entire balance at any time with no problem of calcu-
lating complex prepayment refunds. The credit card establishes the
consumer's creditworthiness, and he is treated as a cash buyer by
sellers with whom he deals.
It is irony indeed that during the decade in which adherents of
"truth-in-lending" legislation fought so valiantly for its passage, the
only sales transaction in which disclosure on an annual interest basis can
be made with accuracy—the closed-end installment sale was greatly
diminishing in importance in all but high-price transactions like the
sale of automobiles. This was due to the rapid growth of revolving
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credit, and, if this trend continues, "truth-in-lending" legislation may
well offer a solution to a problem that has largely disappeared.
C. Inadequacies in the System
Despite the mass of legislation devoted to consumer credit, there
were strong indications by the early 1960's that major problems of
protecting consumers in credit transactions had not yet been solved.
In addition to the vigorous movement among consumer groups to
enact "truth-in-lending" legislation, creation of the federal poverty
program called attention to the consumer-credit problems of the poor.
Caplovitz' popular book, The Poor Pay More, published in 1963,
dramatized the consumer-credit area as one in which the lower eco-
nomic groups most desperately needed legal assistance. Agitation
by consumer groups at the state level focused attention on garnish-
ment, deficiency judgments, and other creditors' remedies. The belief
became current that harsh collection laws had contributed to the rise
in personal bankruptcies. Demands were made for better administra-
tive enforcement of consumer-credit legislation and for strong en-
forcement measures which could effectively deal with unscrupulous
creditors.
Not until the early 1960's could it be said that concern for the
plight of the credit consumer had assumed national proportions.
Ironically, this came about after most of the industrial states had
enacted a mature system of legislation on the subject. Why was this
legislation inadequate to solve the problems of the consumer? The
following example will illustrate a typical situation. A young man
with limited education and a small income lives with his wife in a
small apartment. A personable salesman calls at their apartment and,
in the course of an evening, convinces them that they should buy a
certain model of stereo equipment, the cash price of which is carefully
concealed during the selling process. The buyer is assured that for
every qualified buyer he can produce, the price of the equipment
will be reduced by fifty dollars. Don't they have friends that like good
music? Finally the couple sign a contract which discloses that the
cash price of the stereo is $1,000; the addition of credit insurance
and finance charges results in a total of $1,380 for a 36-month contract.
By the next morning the buyers are remorseful; they doubt that they
have friends who will be willing to buy stereos at this price, and they
have discovered that a comparable model could be obtained at a
nearby appliance store for $300. When the stereo is delivered, they
attempt to reject it, but the delivery man leaves it with them. If they
refuse to make the payments, they will soon receive papers indicating
that an action on the contract has been brought against them. A
default judgment may be followed by garnishment of the buyer's
447
BOSTON COLLEGE INDUSTRIAL AND COMMERCIAL LAW REVIEW
wages, which very often means loss of employment. The young man,
as a practical matter, may have only the alternative of making the
payments or risking the loss of his job.'
Even if the buyer in the above transaction can obtain legal assis-
tance, he may have to be told that the transaction is perfectly legal
under the consumer-credit laws, and that he will have to pay even
though he has been cheated. The seller has no need to exceed the
permissible finance-charge rates in order to make a profit, for he has
greatly inflated the price of the goods to cover the increased risk of
dealing with people in the economic position of the buyer. The statu-
tory disclosure provisions are scrupulously complied with: each item
of charge is set out. But all this means little to the buyer, for he is
sold on the stereo before seeing the contract, and is assured that he
will never have to pay the full amount of the contract because of the
referral agreement. Having a contract which complies with the state's
credit laws, the seller, or more likely a sales finance company that
purchased the contract, is now entitled to use the state courts to
compel the buyer to pay his debt.
Present consumer-credit laws are inadequate to protect consumers,
because they are largely unrelated to many of the important economic
and sociological problems caused by the rapid extension of "easy
credit." 9 As previously indicated, consumer-credit laws have been
aimed at permitting credit suppliers to charge profitable rates and
at regulating the strictly "credit" aspects of transactions—namely,
placing ceilings on, or requiring disclosure of, finance and related
charges. These laws have emphasized protecting the consumer at the
contract-formation stage, and have largely ignored safeguarding him
at the vital default and collection stages of the credit process. Hence,
our society has erected a heavy bureaucracy to compel a small loan
company to refund a five-dollar overcharge to a borrower, but it is
relatively unconcerned by the possibility that the same borrower may
lose his job if his wages are garnished upon his default on the debt.
The theory has been that if the consumer is told what his charges are,
and if the creditor is limited in what he can charge for credit, the
consumer should be able to take care of himself.
If personal bankruptcy rates are any indication, many consumers
have not been able to ration wisely their own use of credit. Many find
themselves so heavily committed that any interruption in their weekly
paycheck, due to sickness, pregnancy, lay-off, garnishment, and so
forth, triggers a series of defaults on all of their consumer contracts.
8 A detailed description of the operations of referral-scheme sellers is set out in
In re State of New York (ITM, Inc.), 3 UCC Rep. Serv. 774 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1966).
See also Frostifresh Corp. v. Reynoso, 274 N.Y.S.2d 757 (Dist. Ct. Nassau County 1966).
9 See Comment, Translating Sympathy for the Deceived Consumers into Effective
Programs for Protection, 114 D. Pa. L. Rev. 395 (1966).
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In many states the creditor possesses a formidable arsenal of rights
and remedies to enable him to collect his debts. Garnishments, wage
assignments, deficiency judgments, confessions of judgment, and the
right to take assignments free of defenses are all rights developed in
the law long before the mass of consumers came into the credit
process. These rights are more appropriate in their original commer-
cial context, in which the parties enjoyed some equality of bargaining
position. For the overcommitted consumer dealing with an unscrupu-
lous creditor, the full application of these rights can lead to catas-
trophe.
Overcommitment has not been the only undesirable consequence of
readily available credit. In a significant number of cases, goods or
services sold are exorbitantly priced, of extremely low quality, or of
absurdly little utility to the consumer. The selling techniques used to
merchandise these goods or services are sometimes either openly
fraudulent, or border on being so. Apparently, when a consumer can
"buy" goods or services by signing his name, often with no down-
payment, his sales resistance is radically lowered. It is probably fair
to conclude that many of the more outrageous selling practices exposed
in recent years, typically in cases concerning housing siding, food
freezers, encyclopedias, dancing lessons, or correspondence-school
courses, were made possible only because of the availability of credit.
The foregoing critique of the present system of consumer-credit
legislation suggests that a shift in emphasis is necessary. The existing
scheme of consumer-credit laws—although well intended and carefully
devised—is vulnerable to the criticism that it supplies largely middle-
class solutions (e.g., rate ceilings, disclosure) to what has increasingly
become a lower-class problem. The concentration of credit legislation
on the narrow "credit" aspects of consumer transactions tends to
leave the consumer with little or no protection at the time when he
most needs it. Current practices of high-pressure consumer-credit
selling or lending make it easy for a consumer to become over-
committed, and our strict system of collection laws makes it difficult
for him to extricate himself. The result may be that the defaulting
consumer is driven into bankruptcy or to welfare relief. The widening
conflict between the existing structure of credit laws and practices
and the governmental aspirations for the assistance of the poor must
be resolved in a manner that will bring credit legislation into greater
harmony wth legitimate community objectives in this area.
II. MAJOR PROVISIONS OF THE PROPOSED CODE
A. Coverage
The proposed Uniform Consumer Credit Code is divided into
seven articles. Article 1 contains definitions of terms used in the
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Code and some general provisions. Articles 2 and 3 are parallel
and contain the principal regulatory provisions in relation to consumer-
credit sales and leases, and consumer loans, respectively. Article 4
contains provisions regulating some aspects of the sale of insurance
in connection with consumer-credit transactions. Article 5 gives certain
judicial remedies to debtors for violations of the Code, and also con-
tains limitations on certain creditor remedies. Article 6 provides an
administrator for the Code, defines his powers, and provides adminis-
trative remedies for enforcement. Article 7 contains provisions which
would allow the formation and licensing of nonprofit debt-counseling
corporations.
The Code applies to "consumer-credit sales," "consumer leases,"
and "consumer loans." These terms refer to transactions between
professional creditors and natural persons, where the purpose of the
transaction is primarily a personal, family, or household purpose, or,
to a limited extent, a farm purpose. The primary intent of the Code is
to cover the extension of credit, whether it be by lenders, lessors, or
vendors, to finance the acquisition of consumer goods and services. The
ordinary long-term, low-interest-rate, home-mortgage loan, although
made for a consumer purpose, presents problems quite diverse from
those incident to the financing of other consumer goods and services,
and will probably not be covered in any way by the Code. There has,
however, been a growing tendency for certain lenders to take real-
estate security in connection with loans made to finance the purchase
of goods and services. These loans differ from ordinary home-mortgage
financing in that normally they involve much higher costs to the
borrower, are of much shorter maturity, and are secured by junior
liens. They are essentially competitive with traditional short-term
consumer credit and will be regulated under the Code.
B. Rate Limitations
Historically, the core of consumer-credit legislation has been the
idea that creditors should be limited in the amount that they can
charge for credit. The concept of usury is deeply ingrained in our
thinking, and it is fair to say that this concept has been the raison
d'être of most of our consumer-credit laws. However, as we have de-
parted more and more from a cash economy in which the use of credit
by the ordinary consumer was unusual, to an economy in which the use
of credit is the norm, usury laws have become less and less relevant. It is
no longer useful to think of usury as applying only to loan transactions.
There is no meaningful distinction between lenders and sellers when
each extends credit to buyers of consumer goods or services. A buyer
of goods or services on credit pays a price which can be divided be-
tween the price for the product and the price for the credit, but,
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from the point of view of the consumer, the important figure is the
total price of the goods or services; how that price is allocated be-
tween "cash price" and "credit charge" is largely unimportant.
In this country, our thinking about usury has led us to fix ceilings
on the amount that can be charged for credit, but our laissez-faire
heritage has prevented us from fixing ceilings on the price of the goods
or services themselves. Thus, we have been caught between opposing
theories concerning how best to protect the buyer. Rate ceilings indi-
cate the necessity of government intervention to prevent "unfair"
pricing, while the absence of ceilings on goods indicates a belief that
the forces of a competitive market will drive prices to a proper level.
Yet, with respect to a single transaction—the credit sale of goods
or services—modern consumer-credit legislation applies both theories.
As credit becomes more the norm, it becomes easier for a creditor
simply to allocate more of the total price paid by the credit buyer to
the price of the goods or services if the ceiling on the credit charge is
too low. Most sales of goods or services are financed either by a sales
finance company that buys the debt from the seller or, to an increasing
extent, by a lender who, in effect, makes a loan to the buyer by allowing
him to pay for the goods or services by means of a credit card. In both
cases part of the return to the financial institution is, or can be, in the
form of a discount from the face amount of the obligation. In other
words, part of the "cash price" goes to the institution which provides
the credit.
Any discussion of rate ceilings—if it is to be at all realistic—
must recognize two factors. First, a ceiling on the credit charge with
respect to a sale is of very limited utility in restricting the price
which the consumer will pay for the goods or services, since the
seller can simply allocate more of the total price to the price of the
goods or services. This ability to allocate depends upon the degree to
which the seller is able to raise his "cash" price. Naturally, the more
a seller bases his transactions on credit rather than cash, the more
is he free to allocate price. But that class of people which most needs
the protection of a rate ceiling is likely to be dealing with sellers
who sell primarily on credit. And even sellers who do a large amount
of cash selling might be so dependent on their credit business that
it would be profitable for them to raise their cash price even if the
result is to lose some cash buyers. When cash prices are thus raised,
cash buyers subsidize credit buyers by paying for part of the cost
of giving credit.
The second factor to be recognized is that, if the ceiling is effec-
tive—as it can be in the case of cash lenders who have no power of
allocation—the result is to limit the people who can obtain credit from
that source. For example, if the ceiling on the annual interest rate
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for loans is ten per cent, only very good credit risks, borrowing rela-
tively large amounts of money, will be able to get loans. As the rate
is raised, more people will get loans, and more small-principal loans
will be made. To the extent that the rate is low, some people will
either not have access to credit at all, or else they will be required
to get it from creditors who are not effectively limited by the credit-
charge ceiling because of their ability to allocate part of the credit
charge to the "cash" price.
As a result of these inherent weaknesses in rate regulation, it has
been forcibly argued that protection of the consumer must be found
in the forces of competition. This, of course, is one of the principal
arguments in favor of "truth-in-lending" legislation. Since credit
charges have been described to the consumer in so many different
ways, it has been difficult for him to make the comparisons upon
which competition depends. A single method of rate disclosure would
thus facilitate competition. Another impediment to competition has
been the presence of licensing requirements and other limitations on
lenders and sales finance companies which have provided artificial
barriers to entry into the market.
The proposed Code has followed the traditional pattern of
providing for rate ceilings, but has tried to put them on a more
rational basis. The Code follows the theory that rate ceilings should
set a maximum limit on rates, rather than set the rate itself. Primary
reliance must be placed on competition to insure "fair" rates of
charge. In other parts of the Code, attempts have been made to en-
courage competition. The Code provides for uniform disclosure of
credit charges as annual rates in those cases in which competition
can play a useful part, and also encourages free entry into all phases
of the consumer-credit business by minimizing restrictive licensing and
other artificial barriers to entry. Moreover, the Code recognizes the
essential similarity between creditors operating in the various seg-
ments of the industry, by attempting to make uniform the rates ap-
plicable to both loan and sale transactions.
C. Disclosure
Provisions requiring that the debtor be given adequate informa-
tion relating to the critical elements of his contract with the creditor
are an essential, and in many cases, principal ingredient of much of
the consumer-credit legislation in effect today. Elementary notions of
fairness dictate that the debtor at least be told, in understandable terms,
the substance of his obligation. Many sophisticated debtors with
bargaining power and alternative sources of credit do not need this
kind of protection; they can obtain for themselves the information
that they desire. But many more debtors probably do need legislative
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protection, and, without that protection, might not get essential infor-
mation.
It is important to recognize, however, that detailed disclosure
provisions entail economic costs. The more detailed the requirements,
the more creditors are saddled with inflexible business forms that
might hinder efficiency in transacting business. Precautions that must
be taken by creditors to prevent error in complying with statutory
mandates necessarily add to clerical and supervisory costs.'
In the proposed Code, the above factors have been recognized,
and an attempt has been made to require the creditor to disclose only
that information which is necessary and meaningful to the debtor,
and which can be given without undue burden to the creditor and
without the concomitant costs that would be passed on to the debtor.
Therefore, the disclosure provisions of the Code do not apply to either
loans or sales if the amount of the loan or sale is $50,000 or more.
The reason for this limitation is obvious. Very large transactions do
not require this special kind of statutory protection. A person with
the economic resources to incur a debt of this size should be able to
obtain whatever information he needs without legislative help. The
figure of $50,000 is arbitrary and might have been set much lower;
the use of this figure, however, will allow very few transactions to
be excluded because of size. With respect to consumer-credit sales, the
disclosure provisions of the Code also do not apply if the debt is
payable in four installments or less and if there is no charge imposed
for credit. Transactions fitting into this category are basically "cash"
transactions and are not characteristic of the typical consumer-credit
sale, in which an extended period of payment is an essential feature.
The disclosure provisions are quite simple. If the debtor signs
anything that obligates him to pay money or perform a duty, he must
be given a copy of the writing. With respect to the basic installment
sale or installment loan (excluding revolving credit), he must be told
what he is buying or borrowing: in the case of a loan, this means the
amount paid to him or for his account; in the case of a sale, the cash
price of the goods or services and a description or identification of
them. He is then given an intemized list of what he must pay, including:
(I) the down-payment, if any, with a statement regarding any allow-
ance for goods traded in; (2) the amount charged for fees paid to
public officials in connection with the credit, such as a fee to record
a security interest; (3) the amount charged for insurance and other
incidental credit charges; (4) the dollar amount of interest or credit
charge payable under the contract; (5) the total amount due under
the contract; and (6) the schedule of installment payments. All of this
10 The authors' analysis of disclosure of finance charges is found in Jordan &
Warren, Disclosure of Finance Charges: A Rationale, 64 Mich. L. Rev. 1285 (1966).
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information can be given without difficulty to a debtor, and most of it
is already. The only exception is that, under these provisions, the
creditor is required to precompute the contract payments and to tell the
debtor in advance the total amount payable for the credit and the
total amount due under the contract. Under current practice, this
information is not always made available to the debtor.
In addition to the items of disclosure stated above, the Code re-
quires in some cases that the creditor state the annual rate of the
finance charge as applied to the amount financed. This rate must
always be given in the case of a loan, and, with respect to sales,
whenever the amount financed is $300 or more. This requirement
satisfies the arguments of the advocates of "truth-in-lending" legisla-
tion that, unless the debtor is given some uniform method of quotation
of the finance charge, he is unable to make comparisons among various
creditors to determine where he can get credit most cheaply.
There are two principal methods of quoting a rate with respect
to a finance charge. The charge may be put in terms of an annual inter-
est or percentage rate, or it can be put in terms of dollars per $100
per year. For example, if a person borrows $100 and is required to
repay $9 per month for 12 months, the finance charge is $8. In terms
of dollars per $100 per year, the finance charge is $8 per $100 per
year; in terms of an annual percentage rate, it is approximately
15 per cent. Either method, if adopted uniformly by all sources of
consumer credit, will allow consumers to make meaningful comparisons
for shopping purposes. The relative merits of the two methods have
been endlessly debated, and both have strong adherents. The latest
draft of the Code adopts dollars per $100 per year.
As a practical matter, the disclosure of the rate of the finance
charge cannot be given in revolving-credit situations typified by the
credit card and the department-store revolving charge account. For
this reason, rate disclosure is not required in these transactions. It
is also not required by the Code in sales transactions where the amount
financed is $300 or less. Rate could be disclosed in these latter trans-
actions, but would probably involve substantial clerical costs. In these
small transactions, the rate-statement has minimum effect, because the
consumer is more concerned with the total price of the goods or
services than with the price of the credit. Therefore, the costs of re-
quiring rate disclosure far outweigh the benefits to be derived.
In the case of credit-card and other revolving-credit and charge-
account transactions, the Code merely provides that the debtor be told
in advance the conditions under which he will incur credit charges
and how these charges will be computed. With each monthly bill he
must again receive this information. In addition, the bill must contain
a statement of his previous balance, amounts debited and credited
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to his account (with separate itemizations of credit charges), his
current balance, and the amount presently payable.
If one of the purposes of disclosure requirements is to discourage
consumers from entering into onerous or unfavorable contracts, dis-
closure comes too late once the contract is made. It is well recognized
that many, if not most, consumers do not carefully read the contracts
that they sign, and may well have been induced to enter into the con-
tract by advertisements or by blandishments of the salesman. One of
the principal weaknesses of some disclosure statutes is that the
statutory control applies only to disclosure in the contract; the pre-
contractual period is ignored. To meet this problem, the proposed
Code contains a general provision making it unlawful to engage in
false or misleading advertising concerning the terms or conditions
of credit. Violation of this provision can be the basis for a cease-and-
desist proceeding by the Administrator of the Code or for an injunc-
tion by a court. The Code also provides that if an advertisement states
the dollar amount of the finance charge or installment payment, it must
also state the rate, in the statutory form, of the finance charge and the
number and amount of installment payments. This provision is de-
signed to prevent advertisements that entice buyers or borrowers by
disclosing only a very low monthly payment without disclosing the
true cost, which can be determined only by knowing the rate of the
finance charge or the length of the contract.
D. Prohibited Contract Terms
Creditors are often able to impose upon debtors contract terms
that are very favorable to the creditor and onerous to the debtor.
Typically, this has been possible because of inequality in the economic
bargaining strength of the parties or because of the debtor's ignorance.
Moreover, consumer-credit transactions are completed by means of
standardized forms, and there is very little chance for the individual
debtor to have these forms changed for his particular transaction.
The forms naturally are written to favor the creditor and cannot
be avoided by the consumer due to the tendency of forms to permeate
an industry. In the absence of effective individual bargaining over
contract terms, legislation must protect the consumer.
The proposed Code contains a number of provisions which are
designed to protect the consumer from a harsh bargain. The concept
of negotiability, which is a creature of the commercial law designed to
foster the free flow of commercial paper, has served a very different
purpose in the consumer-credit area. The credit contract between
buyer and seller is often transferred to a sales finance company which
succeeds to all the rights of the seller, but which, in some states, under
certain conditions, is not subject to any of the defenses that the buyer
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may have against the seller. The result is that even if the buyer has
a good claim or defense against the seller he must pay the finance
company and resort to a law suit against the seller.
The proposed Credit Code prohibits a seller from taking a
negotiable promissory note from a buyer. It also provides that, not-
withstanding any agreement to the contrary, the transferee of the
seller's rights is subject to all claims and defenses of the buyer up to
the amount owed by the buyer at the time the claim or defense is
asserted. One result of these provisions may be to discourage finance
companies from dealing with unscrupulous sellers whose practices give
rise to large numbers of claims or defenses by buyers. In the case
of scrupulous sellers, the occasional instance of a claim or defense
can be easily handled by having the seller repurchase the paper in-
volved. Finance companies should have no difficulty protecting their
interests through provisions in their contracts with sellers.
The Code also contains restrictions on the collateral that can
be taken by sellers as security for payment. It provides that a seller
can take a security interest only in goods sold in the transaction, or,
if the sale involves maintenance, repair, or improvement of the buyer's
property, only in the property affected. The Code adopts the view that
a seller should be able to secure payment of his debt, but that a
security interest in the goods sold is adequate security. It is not unjust
that the buyer should have to give up goods that he has not paid for,
but he should not have to lose other goods which are his own property.
The only exception to this is presented by the case of a seller who sells
a number of different items to a buyer in a series of sales. The Code
allows each sale to be secured by goods sold in the other sales, sub-
ject to a formula which releases goods as the respective debts are
paid off.
There is also a general provision in the Code against enforce-
ment of unconscionable contracts. This provision is basically identical
to Section 2-302 of the Uniform Commercial Code, but extends the
U.C.C. provision to leases of goods and sales of services. In addition,
the proposed Code makes unlawful any referral scheme which bases
the earning of a rebate or discount upon the occurrence of an event
subsequent to the time the buyer agrees to buy.'
One type of sale, in which there have been particular abuses, has
been singled out in the Code for special treatment. Although high-
pressure salesmanship can be practiced anywhere, there is considerable
evidence that the sale in the home is particularly susceptible to such
methods. The proposed Code provides that, if the cash price of the
goods or services in such a sale is $100 or more, the buyer has a
right to rescind the sale by sending a notice of cancellation within
11 See note 8 supra and accompanying text.
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two days after he signs the agreement of sale. To the extent that the
buyer has made any payment to the seller, the seller is entitled to
retain as a cancellation fee $15, or five per cent of the cash price
of the goods or services, whichever is less. The effect of these provi-
sions is merely to delay the consummation of sales made in the home
until the forty-eight-hour period has passed. Satisfied buyers will not
cancel, and dissatisfied buyers will have some short period of repose
away from the pressure of the salesman in order to decide whether
they want to go through with a purchase which may involve a major
commitment.
E. Limitations on Creditors' Remedies
To many consumers faced with an onerous debt, the legal system
appears to be an instrument for oppression rather than a force for
justice. Under the existing system, the state generally remains neutral
and allows the creditor and the debtor to make whatever bargain they
want. Some limitations are imposed, but the state does not, and
probably cannot, prevent the debtor from making improvident commit-
ments that may spell disaster for himself and his family. A position
of relative neutrality by the state is necessary and desirable if we are
to maintain our notions of freedom of contract.
After the bargain has been made, however, the state does not
remain neutral. The full power of the state is available to the creditor
to enable him to collect his debt once he has obtained a judgment.
The ability to use the courts as collection agencies no doubt has
encouraged some creditors to induce debtors to incur more debt than
they can actually manage. Coercion by the state to pay debt is de-
fensible where the debtor can pay but will not, and the specter of the
"deadbeat" is constantly invoked by creditors to justify tough collec-
tion remedies. All too often, however, it is not the "deadbeat," but
rather the naive victim of the overreaching creditor, who is subjected
to the worst collection practices. Moreover, it is becoming increasingly
doubtful whether many of the traditional creditor remedies are needed
by legitimate creditors. With the use of computers and other sophisti-
cated information systems, creditors will soon have the ability to
make very accurate determinations of the creditworthiness of the
applicant. The consumer today is very dependent upon credit, and,
if his ability to get credit depends upon his paying his bills, he will
pay them without the coercion of the state. The proposed Code has
severely limited two creditor remedies which have been the cause of
much injustice in the consumer-credit field—deficiency judgments and
wage garnishments.
If the seller finds it necessary to repossess the property sold in
a credit sale, the Code provides that, in the case of amounts of $500
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or less owed at the time of repossession, the repossession is the ex-
clusive remedy of the seller. Sale of repossessed goods normally
brings a price which is very low in relation to the original purchase
price of the goods. Some high-priced products, such as automobiles,
have a reliable resale market and bring reasonable prices, but for
many products, such as furniture and appliances, resale values are
woefully small. In these cases, a debtor who must pay a deficiency
judgment loses the goods but still owes the purchase price. Indeed,
with the addition of collection costs, he frequently has to pay more
than the purchase price. Under the provisions of the proposed Code,
the creditor is asked to assume some of the risk of nonpayment, at
least in the case of relatively small debts. This is not an unreasonable
burden for him to assume, because he does have the means of pro-
tecting himself. If he takes a reasonable down-payment, if he does
not sell to a buyer overloaded with debt, and if the price of his
product is commensurate with its value, the right to repossess will be
a sufficient remedy in most cases. In any event, he can always sue
for the unpaid debt; however, he must allow the debtor to keep the
goods if he does.
Wage garnishment has been, without question, the creditor
remedy most devastating to the debtor, because the wage-earning
consumer is completely dependent on his job to provide for the
welfare of himself and his family. It is customary in most states to
protect some part of the debtor's wages, but these laws do not prevent
garnishment. Even if a creditor can reach only a small per cent of the
wages, the threat of garnishment is a powerful weapon, because it is
a well-recognized fact that many employers find garnishment ex-
pensive and onerous and will discharge employees whose wages are
garnished. The authors believe that it is vital for the protection of
consumers—particularly those in low-income brackets—that a mini-
mum "living wage" be exempt from garnishment with respect to con-
sumer-credit transactions. The proposed Code provides that a creditor
in such a transaction may not garnish wages except to the extent that
the debtor's earnings are in excess of $100 per week, or, in the case of
a debtor without dependents, $65 per week. The Code prohibits gar-
nishment of.wages prior to judgment and also prohibits the taking of a
wage assignment as security.
F. Debtors' Remedies and Enforcement
A debtor need not pay any charge in excess of that allowed by
the Credit Code, and, if he has paid an excess charge, he is entitled
to a refund. If, after demand, a creditor refuses to make a refund, the
debtor may recover a penalty fixed by the court at not greater than
ten times the amount of the excess charge. If the creditor has violated
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the Code in any other way, the debtor need not pay any finance
charge, and, if he has already paid, he may recover the payment. In
all cases in which the creditor violates the Code, the court may award
reasonable attorney's fees incurred by the debtor.
It is contemplated that the principal enforcement of the Code
will come from the Administrator, who is given broad investigatory
powers, including the subpoena power, to determine whether unlawful
acts are being committed. He may take enforcement action either by
administrative procedures subject to judicial review or by direct ac-
tions in court. After notice and hearing, he may order a creditor or
person acting in his behalf to cease and desist from engaging in any
violation of the Code. He may also order any creditor who has made
charges in excess of those permitted by the Code to refund the ex-
cess charges. Whatever the Administrator may do by administrative
order can also be done by court order, and he may bring an action
to enjoin violations of the Code or for an order to refund charges
made in excess of those permitted by the Code. If the Administrator
brings a court action with respect to excess charges, the court may
also impose a penalty of not more than ten times the excess charges if
the creditor has not agreed to refund prior to the time the action is
brought. In addition, if the court finds that a creditor, or a person
acting in his behalf, has engaged in a course of repeated and willful
violations of the Code, it may assess a civil penalty of not more than
$5,000.
One of the great weaknesses of consumer-credit laws has been a
tendency to emphasize formal aspects of the debtor-creditor relation-
ship and to restrict the reach of the laws to the strictly "credit" aspects
of transactions. It is a fact, however, that there are unscrupulous
creditors who prey on the ignorant and the gullible, and who do so
without violating consumer-credit laws. The proposed Code contains
a provision which could be a powerful weapon in ridding the market
of predatory creditors. Under the Code, the Administrator may bring
an action to restrain a creditor, or a person acting in his behalf, from
making credit sales, leases, or loans, whose terms are unconscionable,
or from engaging in a course of fraudulent or unconscionable conduct
to induce consumers to enter into credit transactions or to collect
debts arising from credit transactions. The court may grant an injunc-
tion if it finds as a matter of law that the contract or conduct is
fraudulent or unconscionable, that substantial injury is threatened,
and that the ability to cause the injury is present primarily because
the transactions are credit transactions.
Fraud in consumer-credit transactions, to the extent that it can
be reached today by actions of public officials, normally is governed
only by the criminal laws,. and these have not been notably successful.
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Even if criminal laws could be fashioned to deal with problems in
this area, they would not be given high priority by understaffed prose-
cutors also charged with dealing with perpetrators of "more serious"
crimes. Under the proposed Code, fraud can be used as the basis for
injunctive relief sought by a public official whose only concern is
consumer credit.
The courts have long dealt with the notion of fraud, and a defini-
tion of it is not included in the Code; "unconscionability" in inducing
contracts or collecting debts is also undefined. However, the latter
term is designed to reach those cases in which creditors go far beyond
the bounds of reasonable behavior and subject debtors to coercion that
would "shock the conscience" of a court of equity. In the case of
unconscionability with respect to the terms of the consumer transac-
tion, the Code does set forth some guidelines for the judge. A finding
of unconscionability is precluded where the bargaining position be-
tween the creditor and the debtor is such that the debtor is able to
fend for himself; the Code applies only where the debtor cannot pro-
tect himself. The court may not find the terms of a contract to be
unconscionable unless it first finds that the creditor has knowingly
taken advantage of the consumer's inability to make a reasonable
contract because of physical or mental infirmities, ignorance or lack
of sophistication concerning transactions of the type involved, or
similar factors resulting in a gross inequality of bargaining strength
between the two parties. The Code provides that each of the follow-
ing is evidence of unconscionability: (1) the creditor's belief at the
time the transaction was made that there was no reasonable probability
of full payment of the obligation by the consumer; (2) the creditor's
knowledge at the time of a sale or lease of the debtor's inability to re-
ceive substantial benefits from the goods or services; and (3) gross
disparity between the price of the goods or services and the price at
which similar goods or services are readily obtainable in credit trans-
actions in the same market by buyers of similar creditworthiness.
The proposed Code provides for a procedure whereby a creditor,
charged with conduct that could be the basis of administrative or
judicial proceedings, may be allowed to sign an "assurance of discon-
tinuance" in which he agrees to discontinue commission of the acts
charged. If the person giving the assurance fails to comply with its
terms, the assurance may be used by the Administrator in subsequent
proceedings as prima facie evidence that the conduct described in
the assurance was committed. This procedure is designed to encourage
informal settlements in those cases in which the Administrator does
not consider formal administrative enforcement to be necessary.
In order to aid the Administrator in keeping abreast with current
developments in the consumer-credit field, and in order to give the
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various interests affected by the Code a chance to make their views
known to the Administrator, the Code provides for a Council of Ad-
visors on Consumer Credit. Members of the Council will serve without
compensation and will be appointed by the Governor, who is charged
with the duty of achieving a fair representation from the public and
from the various segments of the consumer-credit industry. The term
of each member of the Council will be fairly long, perhaps four years,
and terms will be staggered so that there is continuity of membership.
The duty of the Council is to advise and consult with the Administrator
concerning the exercise of his powers under the Code and to make
recommendations to him.
III. CONCLUSION
Articles on consumer credit—particularly those written by college
professors—tend toward gloomy enumerations of the ways in which
the unscrupulous creditor is currently taking advantage of the op-
pressed consumer, spiced by some self-righteous pronouncements on
how all the trouble could be cleared up if the author's solutions were
seized upon by legislators. This article has been no exception. The
truth of the matter is that the American consumer is the marvel of
the world. In the great majority of credit transactions, he is very well
treated indeed and has abundant credit available if he meets minimal
standards. A fact that legislative draftsmen are reluctant to admit is
that the favorable treatment presently accorded to the American
consumer probably owes little to the legislative process. Most likely
the consumer is well off today because a number of reputable credit
grantors are competing for his business.
Clearly discernible trends promise an even better lot for the con-
sumer. The process of diversification among credit suppliers is acceler-
ating; old barriers between segments of the finance industry are falling
away. The result is that more credit suppliers are competing for the
consumer dollar. The Code recognizes this development and encourages
it to continue. A major objective has been to do away with limitations
on the entry of credit suppliers into the credit arena. Only in the small
loan area does the Code retain "character and fitness" licensing, and
it abandons the "convenience and advantage" limitation even there.
Moreover, the consumer should have access to information which
will enable him to decide more easily which of the competing deals
offered to him is better.
Another major development in consumer credit is abandonment
of the expensive, one-shot, closed-end installment sale or loan, and
creation of an open-end continuing relationship between creditor and
consumer. This will result in greater convenience for the consumer
and should in time lower the cost of consumer credit. The proposed
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Code is the first consumer-credit law to deal comprehensively with
the open-end credit arrangement. It allows the modern system of re-
volving credit (e.g., the credit card) to continue its extraordinary
growth unimpeded by doubts regarding the classification of the trans-
action under installment sales laws or usury laws.
Though most consumers are getting good treatment, some are
not. Previous consumer-credit legislation has been remarkably un-
responsive to the plight of the latter group. Though competition is the
boon of the middle-class consumer, it is not the answer to the diffi-
culties of the low-income consumer. The unscrupulous retailer, prey-
ing upon the disadvantaged consumer, has flourished under present
consumer laws. Now the Code gives an administrator the power
(never before present in the retail field) to eliminate the criminal
element. Past credit laws have contained enumerations of prohibited
conduct, which served as guideposts to the illicit credit supplier of
what not to do in conceiving his next scheme. The Code, in its un-
conscionability provisions, gives the Administrator the flexibility neces-
sary to deal with such businessmen. What is more, the Code seeks to
ameliorate the condition of the overcommitted consumer by limiting
somewhat the harsher remedies the creditor can use against him.
Rapidly changing conditions in the consumer-finance industry,
together with new social attitudes toward the legitimate expectations
of consumers--particularly those in the lower economic groups—re-
quire new approaches in consumer-credit legislation. Both creditors
and consumers can benefit from them. The 1967 draft of the proposed
Uniform Consumer Credit Code is the fruit of three years of work
toward this end.
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